

Digital Information, Digital Networks, and The Public Domain

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I. Introduction

Whether the public domain is a virtual wasteland of undeserving detritus or the font of all new creation is the subject of some debate.¹ Those who adhere to the former perspective do not worry about “threats” to this domain any more than they would worry about scavengers who go to garbage dumps to look for abandoned property. Adherents of the latter view are, interestingly enough, not of one mind about “threats” to this domain. Some believe that propertizing value residing in the public domain will produce more social benefit than letting content languish there,² while others regard propertization itself as the main threat to the public domain.³

At the risk of seeming a contrarian, I concur with all three views: some of what is in the public domain is detritus; some of what is valuable in the public domain might be better utilized if propertized to some degree; other parts of the public domain need to remain open and unownable as sources for future creations. In the course of explaining why I embrace this seemingly contradictory perspective, I will offer a map of the public domain.⁴

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¹ Among those who seem to adhere to the former characterization are BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 45-46 (1967) and Robert DeNicola, *Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works*, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 516, 521-22 (1981). Among those who adhere to the latter are JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, & SPLEENS (1998) and Jessica Litman, *The Public Domain*, 39 Emory L.J. 965 (1990).

² See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2000)(quoting Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Ass'n of America as saying that “[a] public domain work is an orphan,” an observation offered as a rationale for perpetual protection for motion pictures); *Eldred v. Reno*, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001)(suggesting that more works will be available if copyright terms are lengthened than if the works go into the public domain).

³ See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, *Free As the Air To Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain*, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); Boyle, *supra* note 1; David Lange, *Recognizing the Public Domain*, 44 Law & Contemp. Prob. 147 (1981).

⁴ The idea of mapping the public domain is not original to me, but rather to Laurel Jamtgaard, formerly a Boalt student and now a practicing lawyer, who proposed to write a paper on this

This map is a useful prelude to a discussion of possible impacts of various legal and policy developments affecting the digital public domain. Some initiatives, I will argue, would have adverse effects on the digital public domain, while others may not. This paper will identify a number of threats to the public domain that deserve attention. It will also celebrate contributions that digitalization and digital networks have made in extending the public domain and enabling projects to preserve the digital commons. In some respects, digital information and digital networks have made the public domain more vibrant and robust than ever before, and if various digital commons initiatives attain their goals, the public domain may flourish as never before.

II. Mapping the Public Domain As a Aid To Understanding Its Present State in the Digital Environment

The public domain has been, for the most part, an uncharted terrain. Sometimes it seems an undifferentiated blob of unnamed size and dimensions.⁵ More often discourse about the public domain focuses on one or a small number of its component parts or traits.⁶ The public domain consists, in fact, of a vast and diverse assortment of contents, as a number of scholars have recognized.⁷ The public domain is, moreover, different sizes at different times and in different countries.⁸ Sometimes the public domain grows, as in the

subject on the theory that such a map might prove fruitful in analysis of public domain issues.

⁵ See, e.g., Edward Samuels, *The Public Domain in Copyright Law*, 41 J. Cop. Off. Soc'y 137 (1993)(public domain is what remains when all forms of protected information are taken into account).

⁶ See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, *Reviving the Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of Public Domain Music*, 46 Duke L.J. 241 (1996) (discussing illegitimate claims of derivative work copyrights in public domain music); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, *Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress*, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1119 (2000)(arguing that the Copyright Term Extension Act is unconstitutional, as was earlier legislation restoring copyrights in foreign works that had been consigned to the public domain by U.S. formality requirements prior to 1989); Arti Rai, *Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science*, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77 (1999)(expressing concern about efforts to propertize human genome data). See also sources cited *infra* notes xx.

⁷ See, e.g., Litman, *supra* note 1; Boyle, *supra* note 1.

⁸ Some things are in the public domain in one country but not another. Some countries, such as the U.K., allow copyright protection for laws and other government works, whereas U.S. law precludes this. See 17 U.S.C. sec. 105. Some categories of intellectual creations that once were in the public domain (e.g., architectural designs as distinct from architectural drawings) are now

aftermath of decisions such as *Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service*,⁹ which held that uncreative compilations of facts cannot be protected by U.S. copyright law or as when patents or copyrights expire. Sometimes it shrinks, as when the European Union promulgated a directive requiring EU member states to protect the contents of databases¹⁰ or when U.S. courts decided that business methods could be patented.¹¹ The public domain also has some murky areas. For example, there are some intellectual creations that are, in theory, in the public domain, but for all practical purposes, do not really reside there.¹² Although I define the public domain as a sphere in which contents are free from intellectual property rights, there is another murky terrain near the boundaries of the public domain consisting of some intellectual creations that courts have treated as in the public domain for some purposes, but not for all purposes.¹³

Across the border from the public domain are several categories of content that are widely enough usable that, for practical purposes, they seem to be part of the public domain.¹⁴ This includes, importantly, much content that is, technically speaking, protected by copyright law but is widely available to the public, as when it is posted on publicly accessible websites available to all comers without fee or apparent restrictions on use. Also outside the public domain in theory, but seemingly inside in effect, are such things as open source software; a penumbra of privileged uses under fair use, experimental use, and

subject to intellectual property rights. Cf. 17 U.S.C. sec. 102(a)(architectural works are listed as among the original works of authorship protected under the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended); 17 U.S.C. sec. 5 (listing protectable subject matters of copyright protection under the Copyright Act of 1909, now superceded, a list that did not include architectural works).

⁹ 499 U.S. 340 (1991).

¹⁰ Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L77) 20 [cited hereinafter as EU Database Directive].

¹¹ *State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Services*, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Policymakers in the European Union have decided not to follow the U.S. in this respect.

¹² A painting from the mid-19th century that remains in a private collection or was destroyed in a fire is, in theory, in the public domain as a matter of copyright law, but its nonpublic nature or its destruction mean that it may, in fact, be there only in theory.

¹³ See, e.g., *Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc.*, 481 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)(illustrations from Beatrix Potter's Peter Rabbit stories were in the public domain as a matter of copyright law, but were nonetheless protected by trademark law when competing publisher included the illustrations in its books).

¹⁴ Some commentators consequently treat some of these contiguous areas as part of the public domain. See, e.g., Benkler, *supra* note xx, at 358, n. 16 (treating fair uses as part of the public domain).

other rules that permit unlicensed uses and sharing of information to take place; and standards that are licensed without payment of royalties.¹⁵ Also at the perimeter of the public domain are works whose intellectual property rights are on the verge of expiring and arguably some creations about to be made (e.g., a new computer programming language or the solution to a longstanding mathematical problem) that, once they exist, will be part of the public domain. In the map below, the public domain is akin to its own nation-state. Various categories of public domain information are akin to regions of that nation. The contents of each category are akin to the cities or villages within that region that, in turn, have populations of various sizes. Some artifacts may reside in more than one “town” (e.g., a scientific article may contain three or four categories of public domain contents).

¹⁵ Until very recently, the World Wide Web Consortium had a policy of standardizing on patented technologies only if they were licensed on a no-royalty basis for W3C purposes. A change in the W3C policy that would allow royalty-bearing licenses has generated some controversy.

Figure 1

A Map of the Public Domain and Adjacent Terrains

scientific principles, theorems, mathematical formulae, laws of nature, & the like

scientific and other research methodologies, statistical techniques, educational processes

ideas, concepts, discoveries, theories, hypotheses

facts, information, data, know-how, knowledge

laws, regulations, judicial opinions, government documents, legislative reports

innovations qualifying for IP protection in which no rights are claimed or in which rights have expired (e.g., copyright, patent, plant variety protection)

innovations not qualifying for IP protection because unoriginal, obvious, generic, or otherwise outside the bounds of IP (e.g., telephone directories, fonts, incremental technical innovation, genericized trademarks such as aspirin, new physical exercises, folklore, grocery lists, blank forms)

words, names, numbers, symbols, signs, rules of grammar and diction, punctuation

about to expire IPR	fair use & like	widely usable	open source	imminent
		w/o restrictions		discoveries

Mapping the public domain and contiguous terrains is useful for several reasons. First, it can help in an assessment of the likely impacts of certain developments, such as the digitization of information and the development of global digital networks on the public domain. Second, the map can be a tool for calibrating the extent to which a particular legal or policy initiative may affect the public domain, either in a positive or negative way. Some legal and policy initiatives, as we shall see, have broader and more serious potential impacts than others. Third, it can contribute to an analysis of which among the contents of the public domain are detritus (e.g., grocery lists) and which gems (e.g., Mozart symphonies), which are among the constitutionally core elements of the public domain (e.g., scientific principles), which elements are there more by chance than design or necessity (e.g., exercises), and which of the public domain's contents will be most harmed if propertized (e.g., information).

That digitization of information can have a very positive impact on the effective existence of the public domain is readily apparent. To the extent scientific data is either collected in or transposed into digital form, it can then be shared and processed more readily than if it remained in paper files in the basement of a scientist's lab.¹⁶ The existence of global digital networks means that scientists from around the world can share data sets and conduct experiments that may lead to further discoveries that will contribute to further growth of the public domain. Similarly, digitization of government information, such as bills pending before the legislature, government reports, schedules for hearings before legislative committees or administrative tribunals, and posting of this information on the Internet makes the information more widely accessible than print equivalents. This makes the public domain more effective and robust in serving that part of the public interested in such information. Digitization of information and the existence of digital networks do not, of course, necessarily enhance the public domain. Firms may be able to attain meaningful exclusive control over digital information that is in the public domain, both in theory and in law, through technological access controls or licensing or both. The LEXIS and Westlaw databases contain hundreds of thousands of public domain judicial opinions and other legal texts in digital form that the database owners control both technologically and by licenses.¹⁷ Do these technical controls or licenses diminish the public domain? Some would argue

¹⁶ See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, *BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA* (1997).

¹⁷ Mead Data Central, a forward-looking paper company that anticipated an era in which digital information might displace paper, started its legal database by scanning print copies of West Pub. Co. books containing laws and judicial opinions to make digital source files.

yes; others would argue no. Printed forms of these materials are, for the most part, still widely available without license or technical restrictions, and they may be a resource for further digitization projects having a non-proprietary character. Even those who care deeply for the continued existence of the public domain in legal information would have to admit that no firm could justify undertaking the very substantial expense of digitizing public domain legal information and building a database of these contents and software tools to enable effective use of the database without some way to recoup these expenses, as through some exercise of exclusive control over the resource. When Mead Data Central initially made its investments in digitizing judicial opinions, neither the government nor other nonprofits had the foresight or the willingness to undertake such a project.¹⁸ Many of us at this conference have greatly benefited by the existence of databases such as LEXIS and Westlaw. Our research today substantially depends on access to them. We would ourselves be less capable of producing new works and making our own contributions to the public domain without access to these databases. Concern about restrictions imposed by proprietary databases of legal information has, moreover, generated a variety of initiatives to “free” legal information from these constraints. Courts themselves have undertaken to publish judicial opinions on court websites. Legislatures post pending bills. Certain law schools, most prominently Cornell, have undertaken to establish non-proprietary databases of key legal information, such as Supreme Court decisions, which are open to all comers.¹⁹ Some for-profit firms provide open Internet access to digitized legal information without charge in the hopes of attracting customers to their sites.²⁰ In these and other initiatives, digitization of the information and the availability of digital networks have been essential components of the strategy for effectively contributing to an enhancement of this aspect of the public domain.

Would some or all of us prefer that the data in the LEXIS and Westlaw databases be available for free on the Internet without restrictions? Perhaps so, and this is surely achievable, although not without cost. The U.S. government could clearly exercise its eminent domain power to acquire rights to make this information freely available on the Internet. But even if the political will could be mustered to do this (about as likely as Osama bin Laden’s conversion to Christianity), would society be better off with a public domain LEXIS? Who would continue to invest in maintaining the database, extending it,

¹⁸ Nor did West Pub. Co. initially perceive the market potential for online databases of legal information.

¹⁹ See, e.g., Legal Information Institute, available at <http://www.cornell.edu/lii>.

²⁰ See, e.g., findlaw.com; bna.com.

and improving its tools? Perhaps social welfare is enhanced by a mix of digital public domain and proprietary databases of legal information, with the public domain sites providing some competition to hold in check the duopolistic tendencies of the market players and providing access to key information, such as pending bills and Supreme Court opinions, to those who cannot afford to pay database access fees.

III. Threats to the Public Domain in the Digital Environment

Threats to the public domain come in different shapes and sizes. A relatively small, although still significant, incursion on the public domain (or should I say the subset of the public domain consisting of digital information?) is represented by the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).²¹ ACPA extends property rights of trademark owners in the digital networked environment well beyond the bounds of trademark law.²² Insofar as ACPA is being used to seize domain names from legitimate organizations and users, this incursion on the public domain is troublesome.²³ As compared with other threats, however, ACPA is a relatively minor threat to the digital public domain. Its impact only extends to one subset of the most southern terrain of the public domain map.

A more substantial and differently configured threat to the digital public domain arose from Congress' enactment of the Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998.²⁴ Strictly speaking, it was a threat when enacted, but it is now a virtual dam blocking the flow of information into the public domain. It will remain so unless a challenge to its constitutionality is eventually successful.²⁵ CTEA's incursion on the public domain is more substantial and economically significant than ACPA's because it affects a larger region of the public domain, altering the legal status of hundreds of thousands of works for decades. Its principal impact may be on non-digital components of the public domain (in contrast, ACPA's impact is only in the digital domain). That CTEA impacts the digital public

²¹ Pub. L. No. 106-113 (1999).

²² See, e.g., Jessica Litman, *The DNS Wars: Trademarks and The Internet Domain Name System*, 4 *Small & Emerg. Bus. L.* 149 (2000).

²³ Sun Microsystems, for example, has been arguing under ACPA that it has rights to obtain all domain names using the term "enterprise" because of its trademark rights in some uses of this term.

²⁴ Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).

²⁵ One legal challenge to the CTEA's constitutionality was unsuccessful, see, e.g., *Eldred v. Reno*, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), although one judge dissented from this decision insofar as CTEA extended the terms of existing copyrights, *id.* at 380-83.

domain can be seen in the thwarted plans of Eric Eldred to build a digital library of works that but for CTEA would be in the public domain.²⁶ CTEA's raid on the public domain has more constitutional significance than ACPA's because the constitutional provision that authorizes Congress to enact intellectual property laws requires limits on the term of copyright.²⁷

Among the legal initiatives primarily aimed at digital information with major implications for the public domain are these: the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA),²⁸ the Collections of Information Anti-Piracy Act (CIAA),²⁹ and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA)³⁰ in tandem with its inevitable brother, the Security Systems Standards and Certification Act (SSSCA).³¹ Each of these initiatives poses threats to the digital public domain that are broader in scope and scale than those posed by CTEA. This is, in part, because of their implications not just for one "region" of the public domain map, but for multiple "regions." Of these initiatives, only CIAA directly offers protection to what is, under current law, public domain material. The other three mainly aim to give an extra layer of protection to intellectual creations most of which are protected by intellectual property law, although each affects the public domain and contiguous territories as well. Before probing each initiative in detail, it is worth pointing out that there may be synergies amongst these initiatives that multiply their effects. Further magnifying the potential effects of these legal initiatives are certain non-legal

²⁶ See *id.* at 374. Other plaintiffs in the Eldred case were non-digital distributors of public domain works affected by the CTEA extension. *Id.*

²⁷ U.S. Constitution, Article I, sec. 8, cl. 8 (exclusive rights may be granted only for "limited times"). The characterization of CTEA as an instance of perpetual copyright on the installment plan derives from the work of Peter Jaszi. See Statement of Professor Peter Jaszi, Washington College of Law, American University, On S. 4839, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Sept. 20, 1995. For an analysis of the constitutional deficiencies of CTEA by one of the counsel for Eldred, see, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, *Copyright's First Amendment*, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1057 (2001). See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller, and William F. Patry, *Symposia: The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long?*, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 651 (2000) (expressing various views on CTEA).

²⁸ Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, <http://www.law.upenn.edu:80/library/ulc/ucita/cita10st.htm> [hereinafter UCITA].

²⁹ See H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999).

³⁰ Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.2860 (1998), the relevant provisions of which are now codified at 17 U.S.C. sec. 1201-04.

³¹ See Declan McCullagh, New Copyright Bill Heading to DC, WIRED NEWS, Sep. 7, 2001 (describing bill).

developments such as the formation of the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) and the DVD Copy Control Association (DVD-CCA) that aim to provide a secure technical infrastructure to avert leakage of copyrighted information that the law alone would be unable to control.³² UCITA's most obvious implications for the digital public domain arise from its rules that would validate mass-market licenses for computer information. *Pro-CD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg*³³—a case decided, it should be said, under state commercial law rules, not under UCITA—is a widely cited example of the use of mass-market licenses to undermine the public domain in digital information.³⁴ ProCD manufactured and mass-marketed a CD-ROM containing white pages listings from thousands of telephone directories in digital form. ProCD could not get copyright protection for this compilation because of the Supreme Court's *Feist v. Rural Telephone* decision, which held that the white pages listings of telephone directories are in the public domain, in part because they consist of "facts" that copyright law does not protect and because, as compilations, they lack sufficient originality to qualify for copyright protection.³⁵ So ProCD put a license in the package containing the CD-ROM of telephone directory information that permitted only personal uses of the data, a restriction that Zeidenberg violated by posting the contents of ProCD's disks on an open site on the Internet. In the view of the trial judge in the *ProCD* case and of many commentators, enforcing this license restriction interfered with achieving policy objectives of copyright law.³⁶ The appellate court disagreed, asserting that the existence of contract between ProCD and Zeidenberg distinguished ProCD's claim from copyright. Because ProCD's license only created rights as between the parties and not rights against the world, the license did not create rights equivalent to copyright.³⁷

³² See, e.g., *DVD-CCA v. McLaughlin*, 2000 WL 48512 (Cal. Super. 2000)(describing DVD-CCA); website of the Secure Digital Music Initiative, <http://www.sdmi.org>.

³³ 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).

³⁴ See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, *Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract*, 12 Berkeley Techn. L.J. 93 (1997); Maureen O'Rourke, *Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach*, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 53 (1997); David Nimmer, Elliot Brown, & Gary Frischling, *The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand*, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 17 (1999).

³⁵ *Feist Pub. Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.*, 499 U.S. 340 (1991).

³⁶ See *ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg*, 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Elkin-Koren, *supra* note xx.

³⁷ *ProCD*, 86 F.3d at xx. Commentators have pointed out that preemption analysis can and should consider whether enforcing the state law would interfere with federal intellectual property policy. See, e.g., Nimmer et al., *supra* note xx.

If UCITA's only impact on the public domain was to protect compilers of unoriginal data against market-destructive appropriations, there would be little reason to worry about this law. However, in a variety of ways, UCITA protects the interests of purveyors of digital information beyond—and in some respects in contradiction with—the default rules of intellectual property and other information laws. First, UCITA willingness to enforce licenses protecting digital forms of public domain information does not depend on whether this is necessary to avert market failures. Second, to the extent that licenses are drafted to bind subsequent users, the distinction between contract rights that bind only the two parties to the transaction and property rights that bind the world erodes significantly.³⁸ Third, in a variety of subtle ways (for example, in presumptively enforcing confidentiality restrictions as to data that would generally be deemed “public” by virtue of its being mass-marketed), UCITA aims to stop leakages of information into the public domain.³⁹ Fourth, UCITA affects the penumbra of privileged uses lying adjacent to the public domain in significant ways. Under UCITA, the paradigmatic transaction is a license, not a sale.⁴⁰ This characterization of the transaction affects rights that copyright law confers on owners of copies of copyrighted content (e.g., to make backup copies of software, to modify software, and to sell or otherwise redistribute software).⁴¹ In addition, UCITA presumes that all license terms are enforceable without regard to whether they aim to override public policy limitations on intellectual property rights.⁴² Many software licenses restrict the right to reverse engineer computer programs, even though this activity would be acceptable under trade secrecy and copyright law as a means to get access to

³⁸ See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, *Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment*, 75 *Ind. L.J.* 1125, 1132-33 (2000) (discussing viral contracts).

³⁹ See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, *Do You Want To Know a Trade Secret? How Article 2B Will Make Licensing Trade Secrets Easier (But Innovation More Difficult)*, 87 *Calif. L. Rev.* 193 (1999). See also David A. Rice, *License With Contract and Precedent: Publisher-Licensors Protection Consequences and the Rationale Offered for the Nontransferrability of Licenses Under Article 2B*, 13 *Berkeley Techn. L.J.* 1239 (1998).

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, *Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law*, 13 *Berkeley Techn. L.J.* 827 (1998).

⁴¹ See 17 U.S.C. sec. 117. This has especially important implications for libraries to the extent that the rightsholder has adopted a “single user license” policy. See, e.g., Stephen King’s electronic novella. Similarly, to the extent that existing consumer protection laws apply to sales of goods, arguably UCITA relieves its licensors from consumer protection responsibilities. See, e.g., Jean Braucher Memorandum.

⁴² See UCITA, sec. 105.

information that, once known, may be part of the public domain.⁴³ UCITA's presumption of enforceability may also apply to clauses in mass market licenses that direct the licensee not to criticize or reveal flaws in the licensed computer information, which affects the legal status of many uses of information at the borders of the public domain.⁴⁴

There are several ways in which the public interest in balanced licensing rules may be protected even if UCITA is, over time, more widely adopted than now. First, section 105 of UCITA recognizes the possibility that courts may rule that some license provisions conflict with federal law or otherwise violate "fundamental public policies," and insofar as they do, they may be unenforceable.⁴⁵ Courts may interpret this broadly and not enforce license restrictions on public domain information when there is no danger of market failure or anti-reverse engineering clauses. Second, courts may invoke other legal doctrines, such as misuse of intellectual property rights and first amendment values, to limit the enforceability of computer information licenses in appropriate cases.⁴⁶ This too may enable reuse of public domain information. Third, new legal doctrines may emerge in the caselaw, such as "fair breach" of licenses to reach similar results under UCITA licenses as under copyright's fair use doctrine.⁴⁷ Fourth, the desire of licensors to impose unreasonable restraints on users by means of licenses may be held in check to some degree by market forces.⁴⁸

⁴³ See, e.g., David McGowan, *Free Contracting, Fair Competition, and Article 2B: Some Reflections on Federal Competition Policy, Information Transactions, and "Aggressive Neutrality,"* 13 Berkeley Techn. L.J. 1173 (1998). For more general expressions of concern about UCITA licenses and fair uses, see, e.g., Nimmer et al., *supra* note xx; Charles R. McManis, *The Privatization (or Shrinkwrapping) of American Copyright Law*, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 173 (1999). But see Joel Rothstein Wolfson, *Contract and Copyright Are Not at War: A Reply to "The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand,"* 87 Calif. L. Rev. 79 (1999).

⁴⁴ See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, *Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing*, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 111, 128-29 (1999).

⁴⁵ UCITA, sec. 105(a), 105(b). Section 105(c) defers to consumer protection laws to the extent they apply to computer information. There is, however, a question as to whether consumer protection laws, which were drafted to protect consumers in transactions involving sales of goods, apply to licensed information.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., Lemley, *supra* note xx.

⁴⁷ See Jane C. Ginsburg, *Copyright Without Walls: Speculations on Literary Property in the Library of the Future*, 42 Representations 53 (1993).

⁴⁸ See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, *The License is the Product: Comments on the Promise of Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing*, 13 Berkeley Techn. L.J. 891 (1998).

How much comfort one should find in these checks on UCITA licenses is hard to gauge, given that UCITA essentially allows vendors of computer information to give themselves more rights than intellectual property law would do and to avoid the burdens of public interest limitations.⁴⁹ Licensor restrictions are guarded, under UCITA, by a “heavy presumption” in favor of enforceability;⁵⁰ this can only be overturned after lengthy and expensive litigation that those injured by UCITA licenses may not have the means or will to undertake. Many will simply be chilled from engaging in activities that would be determined legitimate had they been able to challenge a UCITA license term. Parents may blithely ignore the license term for the Adobe e-book version of *Alice in Wonderland* that forbids reading the book aloud, but libraries have greater reason to worry about the potential enforceability of such a term.

In contrast to UCITA, whose scope is presently restricted to transactions in computer information,⁵¹ legislation proposed to protect the contents of data compilations resembles CTEA in affecting more than the digital public domain. However, much of the rationale for such legislation relies on the vulnerability of information in digital form to market-destructive appropriations,⁵² and this legislation would certainly affect the size and scope of the digital public domain. Under current U.S. law, neither unoriginal compilations nor the data in original (and hence copyrightable) compilations is legally protectable (unless it is a trade secret or otherwise confidential).⁵³ Several times in the past five years, the U.S. Congress has considered legislation to protect the contents of databases akin to that adopted by the European Union in 1996.⁵⁴ The EU regime grants those who have invested substantial resources in making a database fifteen years of exclusive rights to

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, *Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,”* 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462 (1997).

⁵⁰ See UCITA, sec. 105(b).

⁵¹ Drafters of this model legislation once intended this legislation to regulate all transactions in information. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, *Licensing Information in the Global Information Market: Freedom of Contract Meets Public Policy*, 21 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 386 (Aug. 1999) (discussing the evolution of the scope of UCITA’s subject matter).

⁵² See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, *Intellectual Property Rights in Data?*, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 51 (1997) (discussing the rationale for sui generis database legislation).

⁵³ See, e.g., *Feist Pub. Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Inc.*, 499 U.S. 340 (1991).

⁵⁴ See, e.g. Reichman & Samuelson, *supra* note xx (discussing H.R. 2652); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhler, *Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology*, 14 Berkeley Techn. L. J. 793 (1999) (discussing H.R. 2281 and H.R. 354).

control the extraction and reuse of all or substantial parts of the contents of that database.⁵⁵ Database rights are renewable upon further expenditures of resources, and substantiality is to be judged in both qualitative as well as quantitative terms.⁵⁶ The most recent EU-style database bill introduced into the U.S. Congress was the CIAA.⁵⁷

Although its sponsors characterize CIAA as a regulation of unfair competition,⁵⁸ opponents characterize it as an intellectual property regime that is unconstitutional, bad public policy, or both.⁵⁹ CIAA differs from the EU Directive in requiring proof of harm to actual or potential markets⁶⁰ and in its “reasonable use” limit on the liability of scientific and educational users for extractions and uses data in protected compilations,⁶¹ as well as in several outright exemptions (e.g., for news reporting, verification, and genealogical information).⁶² However, by conferring rights on compilers to control the use or extraction of all or a substantial part of a collection of information that is the product of substantial investment,⁶³ CIAA would substantially contract the digital public domain—and not just as to items of information, but also as to public domain works (e.g., Shakespeare’s plays) which fall within the meaning of “data” under the legislation.⁶⁴ The main reason that CIAA has not been enacted is that organizations of scientists and a coalition of Internet-based

⁵⁵ EU Database Directive, *supra* note xx, art. 7, 10.

⁵⁶ *Id.*, art. 10.

⁵⁷ H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999).

⁵⁸ See, e.g., H.R. Rep., 106-349 (1999).

⁵⁹ Professor Benkler considers CIAA to be an intellectual property law rather than an unfair competition law. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, *Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information*, 15 *Berkeley Techn. L.J.* 535, 575-86 (2000). Benkler concludes that CIAA is unconstitutional. *Id.* at 586-87. See also Malla Pollack, *The Right to Know? Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment*, 17 *Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.* 47 (1999). But see Jane C. Ginsburg, “No Sweat?” *Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Publications*, 92 *Colum. L. Rev.* 338 (1992) (arguing that database protection legislation would be constitutional). Whether EU-style legislation is a good idea as a matter of policy is a matter of heated debate. See, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson (critical of EU-style legislation); Reichman & Uhler, *supra* note xx (critical of EU style legislation); Ginsburg, *No Sweat*, *supra* (supportive of EU style legislation).

⁶⁰ H.R. 354, sec. 1402.

⁶¹ *Id.*, sec. 1403.

⁶² *Id.*

⁶³ *Id.*, sec. 1402.

⁶⁴ *Id.*, sec. 1401.

firms (including prominently Yahoo!) recognized the serious threats that CIAA posed to the digital public domain and mobilized against this legislation.⁶⁵ In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress has other more urgent matters to consider, but like the Terminator, CIAA will almost certainly be back.

Although CIAA and the EU database law pose substantial threats to the digital public domain, more narrowly crafted legislation to protect data compilations against market failures would not. H.R. 1858 is the alternative bill to CIAA considered during the last Congressional session.⁶⁶ It forbids duplicating another firm's database and then engaging in direct competition with it.⁶⁷ While this bill would, of course, affect the public domain, it does so in a much narrower and more targeted way than CIAA. Assuming there was persuasive evidence that market failures were occurring or imminent in the database industry because firms were competitively duplicating existing databases, this limitation on the reuse of public domain information would be justifiable.⁶⁸ This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in *International News Service v. Associated Press* which held that INS had engaged in unfair competition with AP when its reporters took news from early editions of AP newspapers and published it verbatim in INS papers directly competing with AP papers.⁶⁹ The Supreme Court's *Feist* decision may have said

⁶⁵ See, e.g., Reichman & Uhler, *supra* note xx.

⁶⁶ H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999).

⁶⁷ *Id.*, sec. 102.

⁶⁸ In previous work, I have expressed support for narrowly drawn database protection. See Reichman & Samuelson, *supra* note xx. See also Reichman & Uhler, *supra* note xx (endorsing an unfair competition approach to database protection); Benkler, *supra* note xx (concluding that unfair competition legislation to protect data compilations would be constitutional). In addition, I have endorsed a short term of anti-cloning protection for industrial compilations of applied industrial know-how. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapur, & J.H. Reichman, *A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs*, 94 *Colum. L. Rev.* 2308 (1994). One of the strongest advocates of the public domain has also endorsed intellectual property protection for shamanic knowledge (which U.S. law would likely consider to be in the public domain). See Boyle, *supra* note 1, at xx.

⁶⁹ 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The Court's decision is persuasive as a matter of unfair competition, but has been widely criticized insofar as it relied on the existence of a "quasi-property" right in AP to stop INS's misappropriation. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, *Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutory Impulse*, 78 *Va. L. Rev.* 149 (1992); Pamela Samuelson, *Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?*, 38 *Cath. U.L. Rev.* 365 (1989).

that “raw facts can be copied at will,”⁷⁰ but the Court qualified this statement with a reference to its *INS v. AP* decision.⁷¹

The DMCA, like UCITA, principally aims to provide an extra layer of protection for commercially valuable digital information that is already protected by intellectual property law. Like UCITA, the DMCA posits that private firms are free to devise regulatory regimes for their information products that deviate from the default rules of intellectual property law.⁷² The principal difference between UCITA and the DMCA is that the DMCA’s extra layer of protection is focused on technical measures used to protect digital information, whereas UCITA’s extra layer protects licenses. Following on Lawrence Lessig’s insights,⁷³ we might characterize the DMCA as code (law) that reinforces code (program instructions) as code (a private regulatory regime). Hacking is the act of civil disobedience (or user self-help) to which code as code is vulnerable. This is why the DMCA makes it illegal to “hack” certain technical measures and to make or distribute hacking tools.⁷⁴

Although not principally aimed at protecting public domain works, the DMCA has significant implications for the digital public domain and for territories contiguous to the public domain. Technical measures will be effective in protecting public domain information as long as the vendor has the presence of mind to use the same technical measure to protect digital versions of both public domain and copyrighted works.⁷⁵ Technical measures will, unless programmed otherwise, persist after copyrights expire, thereby undermining new entrants to the digital public domain. Even if one could successfully argue that bypassing an access control used to protect a public domain work was not actionable under the DMCA’s anti-hacking rule (because that provision only

⁷⁰ Feist, 340 U.S. at 350.

⁷¹ Id. at 354.

⁷² See, e.g., Cohen, *supra* note xx. See also Tom Bell, *Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine*, 76 N. C. L. Rev. 557 (1998).

⁷³ See LAWRENCE LESSIG, *CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE* 6 (2000) (discussing computer program code as a regulatory regime).

⁷⁴ 17 U.S.C. sec. 1201.

⁷⁵ The implications of the DMCA rules for the public domain have been recognized by many commentators. See, e.g., Benkler, *supra* note xx, at 421; David Nimmer, *A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act*, 148 U. Penn. L. Rev. 693, 738-40 (2000); Hannibal Travis, *Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian Copyright and the First Amendment*, 15 Berkeley Techn. L.J. 777, 861 (2000).

protects technical measures used by *copyright owners* to protect access to their works),⁷⁶ it would generally be necessary to build a tool to bypass any technical measure controlling access to public domain and copyrighted information, and that tool would arguably be illegal under the DMCA because it would necessarily enable bypassing of an access control that protected copyrighted works.⁷⁷ Even Judge Lewis Kaplan who otherwise found the application of the DMCA untroublesome as to Eric Corley's posting of circumvention software on the Internet seemed somewhat concerned that the DMCA might be used to protect public domain works in contravention to copyright policy.⁷⁸

The more serious and immediate concern about the DMCA is not about its implications for the public domain but about its implications for territory contiguous to the public domain where fair use and other privileged acts have long resided.⁷⁹ Under existing law, technical measures do not need to be designed to enable privileged uses, and few thus far deployed do so.⁸⁰ The technical measure widely used to protect DVD movies, for example, do not enable fair uses to be made; indeed, it does not even permit users to skip through commercials included on the disk.

Debates have raged in the law review literature as to whether Congress intended to preserve some room for fair uses under the DMCA and whether the DMCA is constitutional to the extent they did not so intend.⁸¹ A substantial consensus exists among scholars that without some room for fair use hacking, the DMCA would be

⁷⁶ 17 U.S.C. sec. 1201(a)(1)(A).

⁷⁷ 17 U.S.C. sec. 1201(a)(2). See also *id.*, 1201(b)(2)(outlawing making or distributing other anti-circumvention tools). The vendor of technically protected public domain works might not have standing to complain about such a tool unless it used the same technical measure to protect works in which it did own copyrights.

⁷⁸ *Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes*, 111 F. Supp.2d 294, 338, n. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

⁷⁹ See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, *WIPO Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will Fair Use Survive?*, 21 *Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev.* 236 (1999); Pamela Samuelson, *Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be Revised*, 14 *Berkeley Tech. L.J.* 519 (1999).

⁸⁰ An exception is technically protected digital audio tapes which permit first generation digital copies. See *infra* notes xx and accompanying text.

⁸¹ Cf. Nimmer, *supra* note xx (fair use not preserved); Samuelson, *supra* note xx (fair use preserved to some degree); Jane C. Ginsburg, *From Owning Copies to Experiencing Works* in *UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW* (Hugh Hansen, ed., forthcoming 2001) (fair use preserved to some degree; DMCA might be unconstitutional without some fair use limitations).

unconstitutional.⁸² However, federal judges may be reluctant to reach strike down the DMCA given the vulnerability of digital information products to uncontrolled infringements. No judge wants to second-guess the Congressional judgment that this law is necessary to the survival of the entertainment industry, exaggerated though this claim may be.

The SSSCA has yet to be introduced in legislation, but Senators Hollings has announced that his intent to sponsor it.⁸³ The assumption underlying this legislation would seem to be that digital content cannot be effectively protected by software protections because these are too easy to hack and the programs to bypass them, even though illegal under the DMCA, can be easily distributed via the Internet.⁸⁴ Content won't really be secure until and unless hardware systems embed technical protections in them. The SSSCA would require all interactive digital devices to comply with standard technical protection measures.⁸⁵ In this respect, the SSSCA resembles the Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) that requires vendors of consumer-grade digital audio taping (DAT) technologies to install serial copy management system (SCMS) chips that prevent the making of perfect digital copies of digital sound recordings.⁸⁶ The AHRA represents a compromise between copyright owner and consumer interests because the SCMS chip allows consumers to make a usable first generation copies of music, thereby allowing some

⁸² See, e.g., Ginsburg, *supra* note xx; Glynn S. Lunney, *The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying and the DMCA*, Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2001); Neil Netanel, *Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein*, 54 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2001) (DMCA unconstitutional unless some fair use limitations). See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Intellectual Property Professors, submitted to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in *Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes* (Jan. 26, 2001), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/MPAA_DVD_cases/20010126_ny_lawprofs_amicus.html.

⁸³ McCullagh, *supra* note xx. See also McCullagh's summary of SSSCA at <http://216.110.42.179/docs/hollings.090701.html>.

⁸⁴ See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, *THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 154-64* (2000)(software-based technical measures vulnerable to hacking) [cited hereinafter as "Digital Dilemma"].

⁸⁵ The text of the Aug. 6, 2001 staff draft of the SSSCA can be found at <http://cryptome.org/sssca.htm>. One important question that this legislation does not address, but that will affect the impact of this legislation on the digital public domain, is whether SSSCA devices would have to be built not to render or read digital information lacking copyright management information.

⁸⁶ See 17 U.S.C. sec. 1002.

fair uses of the music.⁸⁷ However, any copies made from those copies degrade in quality.

The SSSCA, as presently written, does not contain a similar compromise provision, and the entertainment industry will undoubtedly resist efforts to add one. The implications of the SSSCA, if enacted, on the public domain and contiguous terrain would be profound. Once technical protection measures are embedded in hardware, hacking to release public domain information or to enable fair or other privileged uses will become much more difficult than at present—and indeed, that would seem to be the point of making systems more secure.⁸⁸ The computer industry has successfully opposed legislation that would have required them to install copy-protection systems in the past,⁸⁹ so they may be allies of advocates of the digital public domain in lobbying against SSSCA.

More likely, at least in the short run, is scaled-back legislation applicable to consumer electronics equipment, but not (yet) as to computers. This would address a key problem for the content industry: manufacturers of consumer electronics equipment want to make products that customers will be eager to buy, and customers prefer technologies that enable them to copy and share digital content over those that lock the content down to one device. Efforts, such as the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), which aim to establish standards for technically protecting digital content which can then be built into equipment or rendering software, are not easy to bring to fruition because of the content industry has very different interests than the consumer electronics industry. Why waste all that time, money, and energy in a long drawn out negotiation with the consumer electronics industry that doesn't share your perspective on the need for technical protections when generous campaign contributions and years of successful lobbying experiences provides access to a group with a long history of sympathizing with copyright industry concerns, namely, the U.S. Congress? If private legislation proves unsuccessful, public legislation offers an alternative means to the desired end.

Which among these three initiatives—UCITA, CIIA, and DMCA/SSSCA—poses the most serious threat to the digital public domain? Each is a serious threat in its own right, but more significant are the potential synergies among them (assuming all are enacted in the

⁸⁷ Sellers of DAT machines and tapes must, however, make regular payments of two percent of their sales to the U.S. Copyright Office to fund a royalty pool for compensating copyright owners for personal use copying. See 17 U.S.C. sec. 1003-04.

⁸⁸ The open source community perceives SSSCA as a threat to their continued ability to continue to develop open source and publish open source software.

⁸⁹ See, e.g., *RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.*, 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).

form currently proposed and are deemed constitutional). Any compilation of digital information protectable by CIAA may also be protected by a UCITA license and by a technical protection measure capable of enforcing any restriction imposed on the digital information (and legally validated by the DMCA and CIAA). Even if CIAA exempts “reasonable uses” from liability, such uses may be thwarted by the terms of a UCITA license or by a technical measure controlling what the user can and can’t do with the information.

As between UCITA licenses and technical measures (backed up by the DMCA), the more significant threat to the digital public domain and to reasonable uses of digital information would seem to be from technical measures. Secure systems do not allow reasonable uses to be made of protected digital information unless those uses have been paid for, whereas one can always ignore a UCITA license provision purporting to override rights to use information arising under other laws or to challenge its enforceability in a legal proceeding. A person who makes reasonable uses of CIAA- and UCITA-protected information which the licensor claims are breaches of the license can at least argue that the license term interferes with federal intellectual property policy and should be preempted, is a misuse of intellectual property rights, is a fair breach of the license, or is unconscionable.⁹⁰ Ignoring a technical measure will be ineffectual because it will simply enforce the licensor’s rules regardless of what the law might say. A legal challenge to a technical measure interfering with reasonable uses is, given early court interpretations of the DMCA, unlikely to succeed or be cost-effective. Some scholars have endorsed “self-help” measures by users to preserve the public domain or have argued for changes to the DMCA so that anti-circumvention protections would only be available to copyright owners who had escrowed keys to unlock technical protections so that prospective fair users could get access to them.⁹¹

Although the Internet was initially architected as an open information environment, it is capable, as Lawrence Lessig has pointed out, of evolving into an architecture of perfect control.⁹² The DMCA and SSSCA are elements of a legal infrastructure that

⁹⁰ See sources cited supra notes xx and yy; J.H. Reichman & Jonathan Franklin, *Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information*, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 875 (1999).

⁹¹ See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, *Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help*, 13 Berkeley Techn. L.J. 1089 (1998); Dan Burk & Julie E. Cohen, *Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright Management Systems*, Harv. J. L. & Tech. (forthcoming 2001).

⁹² Lessig, supra note xx, at 6-7.

would support such a “secure” technical infrastructure. Governments and commercial entities may prefer architectures of control to architectures of openness.⁹³ Although the reasons for their preferences may differ, their goals may converge sufficiently to make them allies in insisting on greater control over the online environment. This would diminish the digital public domain.

As between UCITA and CIAA, it is difficult to say which would have the most harmful effects on the digital public domain. CIAA would have a more immediate impact on this domain because it would propertize collections of digital information across the board. Analysts who have studied its exceptions and limitations do not believe they adequately protect the public interest.⁹⁴ It is, of course, possible that courts will construe its exceptions and limitations more generously than intended in order to comport with constitutional requirements.⁹⁵ CIAA has not yet been enacted, and it may evolve into a more balanced piece of legislation in response to criticisms leveled at high protectionist versions of the bill.⁹⁶ UCITA does not directly diminish the public domain; it only presumptively validates license terms that implicate the public domain and adjacent terrain. The harm UCITA may do to the digital public domain is more likely to occur indirectly, that is, from the manner in which information providers license information and the extent to which they enforce license limitations. The same may be true for the DMCA. That is, how much harm it ultimately does to the digital public domain and contiguous terrain depends in large part on how copyright owners deploy technically protected products in the marketplace and the extent to which (if any) courts limit uses of the DMCA against liberators of public domain information or fair users.

Threats to the digital public domain should also be gauged in terms of their likelihood of enactment and success. The CTEA constitutes the most substantial threat to the digital

⁹³ Id. at 54-60. Governments may want more control over the Internet in order to stop gambling or to protect children from patently offensive materials; commercial firms may want more controls over the Internet in order to protect commercial transactions.

⁹⁴ See, e.g., Benkler, *supra* note xx, at 583-84; Reichman & Uhlir, *supra* note xx, at 811-12.

⁹⁵ If, for example, an historian of the Vietnam War extracted and used a substantial quantum of data from a compilation of data about weaponry of that war, a court might consider the First Amendment as a limiting principle on CIAA liability.

⁹⁶ See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, *supra* note xx, at 823-28 (discussing Senator Hatch’s discussion draft of database legislation).

public domain because it has already been enacted and it has successfully (thus far) blocked works from entering the public domain. The DMCA's anti-circumvention rules are also in effect, and its anti-tool rules have so far withstood fair use-related challenges.⁹⁷ In the two years since its initial promulgation, UCITA has been enacted in two states.⁹⁸ It has met with resistance in several state legislatures, and its future is clouded because of the controversies surrounding it. As noted above, Congress has not adopted CIAA (although the House of Representatives passed it twice in 1998⁹⁹). Compromise legislation may be necessary to attain enactment, and this would presumably limit the damage that CIAA would do to the digital public domain. SSSCA has yet to be introduced in Congress, although with the first hearing having already been scheduled to consider it, its introduction must be imminent. SSSCA has very little immediate chance of passage, but it is an ominous portent for the future.

As for private initiatives, DVD-CCA has, through a complex licensing arrangement, successfully ensured that all DVD players sold in the U.S. and elsewhere have technical measures embedded in them. The huge success of the DVD movie market shows that the content industry's fond hope that consumers will buy technically protected content once they get used to it may have some chance of being actualized. The overwhelming majority of movies distributed on DVDs are works in copyright, not public domain works, so the impact on the digital public domain from CSS-protected DVDs is consequently limited, although impacts on fair uses are considerable. SDMI has been less successful as a content industry initiative to ensure secure content and secure players, but there is every reason to believe the major players in the sound recording industry will move forward with distributing technically protected content. They are, moreover, aggressively challenging through litigation a range of technologies they perceive as threats to their interests. MP3 files of commercial sound recordings and technologies for distributing MP3 files have come dangerously close, in the industry's view, to an involuntary dedication of this digital content to the public domain.¹⁰⁰ While some commentators assert that efforts to use technical

⁹⁷ See, e.g., *Reimerdes*, 111 F.Supp.2d 294; *RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc.*, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 (W.D. Wash. 2000).

⁹⁸ The states that have enacted UCITA are Virginia and Maryland.

⁹⁹ The House version of the legislation that became the DMCA included CIAA. However, because the Senate had not given due consideration to CIAA or similar legislation at that point and because of non-consensus about such legislation, the Senate would not agree to the inclusion of CIAA in the DMCA. See Reichman & Uhlir, *supra* note xx, at 829-30.

¹⁰⁰ See, e.g., *Digital Dilemma*, *supra* note xx, at 76-94 (analyzing digital music as "intellectual property's canary in the digital coal mine").

measures to protect mass-marketed digital content and legislation such as the DMCA will prove as futile as trying to make water not wet,¹⁰¹ it remains an open and hotly contested question how technology, digital content, and the law will evolve and interact in the next decade or so.

IV. Strategies for Preserving and Nurturing the Public Domain in the Digital Environment

One of the goals of this conference is to articulate strategies for preserving and nurturing the public domain as a natural (if intangible) resource. This is a particularly appropriate goal as to digital information because it is so cheap and easy to collect, store, process and make available via global digital networks. The Thomas database of materials on legislation pending before Congress is an example of a digital public domain resource of great value to the public. Other federal government websites publish in digital form on the Internet agency reports, procedures for applying for benefits, schedules of hearings, judicial opinions, rulemaking data, and the like. Numerous states have made similar resources available on open sites on the Web. In addition, projects to establish digital libraries, digital repositories, knowledge conservancies, creative commons, and the like already exist, and more such initiatives will surely be undertaken in the coming years. Scientists have created a variety of digital public domain resources, including libraries of reusable code and databases of scientific and technical information in digital form, which are also available on the Internet. The Library of Congress has not undertaken digitalization projects of historically significant parts of the Library's collection. It has also convened a group to consider strategies for digital preservation of information. Both have very substantial and positive implications for the digital public domain. As much information may be lost to the public domain because it was stored in proprietary formats that are no longer readable by current generations of technologies as by legislation such as CIAA or UCITA..

Entrepreneurial individuals have also taken advantage of the Web to make available a wide array of materials that, strictly speaking, are protected by copyright but that are posted on open websites with few or no restrictions on copying or distribution. This includes articles written by academics posted on their home pages, pre-print archives of articles enabling scientists to share the latest learning in their fields, electronic journals, newsgroups, web resources on the poster's favorite topic, and MP3 files of music posted

¹⁰¹ See Bruce Schneier, *The Futility of Digital Copy Protection at 2* (on file with the author).

by bands wanting to attract new audiences. Brewster Kahle has created a vast nonprofit digital archive of the Internet and World Wide Web so that researchers can investigate such things as how much the Web has grown over time, what changes occur in the languages used on the Web over time, and what proportion of Web content is taken down or put up in units of time, just to name a few researchable questions. A very substantial amount of high quality free content is available on the web (although junk information is also prevalent). Even sites of profit-making entities, such as espn.com, cnn.com, and nytimes.com, post a large volume of high quality information on the Internet which are accessible by those who are willing to let cookies be planted on his or her hard drive or sign up as a user.

Among the most interesting developments that contributes to the digital public domain, even though, strictly speaking, not in it, is open source or “free” software.¹⁰² Open source software contributes to the public domain because its licenses require that source code instructions be publicly available. All of the know-how embodied in the program will thus be accessible. Because open source licenses encourage follow-on innovation, open source contributes to ongoing learning that further enhances the public domain. Open source software is not itself in the public domain. Rather, it invokes intellectual property rights as the basis for a licensing strategy aimed at preserving a digital commons the program’s developer wished to establish for it.¹⁰³ From the standpoint of many open source developers, dedicating a program to the public domain is a suboptimal strategy for achieving open source objectives because proprietary derivatives can be made of public domain programs. Those who breach the terms of an open source license by making a proprietary derivative program will be deemed infringers of the underlying intellectual property rights in the program and can be enjoined from this form of free-riding on open source development. Thus, open source licenses use property rights to preserve

¹⁰² See, e.g., Chris DiBona, Sam Ockman, and Mark Stone, *Introduction to Open Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revolution*, (O’Reilly 1999), <http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/opensources/book/intro.html>.

¹⁰³ See, e.g., Eben Moglen, *Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright*, First Monday (August 1999) available at <http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/publications/anarchism.html> (discussing the General Public License used by the Free Software Foundation). The open source community has mixed feelings about UCITA. On the one hand, members like the fact that mass-market licenses are enforceable and that warranties can be disclaimed. On the other hand, open source developers depend on the ability to reverse engineer and make other unauthorized uses of other firms’ software and hence are generally opposed to enactment of UCITA.

and maintain a commons in an existing intellectual resource.¹⁰⁴ While the initial subject matter of open source development was software, some efforts are being made to adapt open source licenses to other subject matters, such as digital music.¹⁰⁵

As admirable as open source may be as an example of a strategy for preserving and extending the digital commons, there is also value of preserving a public domain from which proprietary derivatives can be made. One of the key objections to CTEA is concern about new works that will not be created because of it. An inducement to the creation of new works from the public domain is the incentive of copyright protection for the derivative work. Writers would be less likely to adapt a public domain story into a dramatic play if the play, once written, had to be dedicated to the public domain because its genesis was a public domain work.

As worthy of our attention as risks to the public domain, so are risks to investments in developing high-value digital information products. The marginal cost of reproducing and distributing digital information may be zero (or nearly so), but initial development costs may still be high, as may be costs of transforming the digital information into marketable form and then of marketing it. While some hoped that advertising would provide a sustainable revenue stream through which digital content providers could recoup investments, this seems a less viable long-term strategy after the dot.com bust. Some commentators have proposed that firms give digital content away for free and rely on what were previously ancillary markets as their new primary markets (e.g., sell support or customization services instead of software or sell concert tickets instead of copies of digital music).¹⁰⁶ This may be a more viable strategy for some digital content than for all. Some economists have suggested that digital content providers sell different versions of their products on different terms to different customers, for example, giving away some content to create demand for one's product, but offering higher value versions for a higher price, or offering some information for free or at very low cost, but charging more to those willing

¹⁰⁴ See, e.g., Carol Rose, *The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems*, 83 Minnesota L. Rev. 129 (1998) (suggesting that limited common property rights may be appropriate for some types of digital information). This, in essence, is what open source licenses assert.

¹⁰⁵ See, e.g., Oscar S. Cisneros, *Expanding the Universe of Ideas*, Wired News (June 17, 1999), <http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/20276.html> (discussing the open publication license); CAFÉ project and open audio license at <http://www.eff.org>.

¹⁰⁶ See, e.g., Esther Dyson, *Intellectual Value*, 3.07 WIRED 136 (1995).

to pay for earlier access to the information.¹⁰⁷ With a good business model, intellectual property rights may be much less important.¹⁰⁸ The digital information market is quite unstable right now in part because no one is sure what business models are viable for distributing digital information via global networks. The fear, uncertainty and doubt this has engendered among content providers may explain why they have been so intent on getting stronger legal rights. They don't exactly know what they need but feel they need more rights just in case an emerging business model might be based on them. What they don't need, they won't use.¹⁰⁹

V. Conclusion

This paper has considered a variety of ways in which the digitalization of information and the development of global digital networks have made positive contributions to the public domain. It mapped the public domain as an aid to assessment of how threatening various legal and policy initiatives are for the digital public domain. UCITA, CIIA, and the DMCA affect a broad swath of the digital public domain and contiguous territories, such as the realm of fair uses, and as shown above, these legislative initiatives may produce synergistic effects further undermining the digital public domain unless something happens to prevent this.

There are several ways to avert these threats to the digital public domain. First, Congress or, in the case of UCITA, state legislatures, can become more aware and attentive to expressions of concern about the ill effects these laws would have and either decide not to enact them or to amend them to alleviate the problems they present. Second, the courts could construe these laws more narrowly than they were initially drawn, strike them down as unconstitutional, or interpret them as unconstitutional unless limited by public domain and fair use principles. A key obstacle to reliance on the Constitution is that courts too often behave as though there is an intellectual property exception to the First

¹⁰⁷ See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, *INFORMATION RULES* (1998); *Digital Dilemma*, supra note xx, at 176-86 (discussing various business models for digital content).

¹⁰⁸ *Id.* at 183-84 (“one approach to IP rights in a world where digital content is difficult to control entails selecting a business model that does not require strict control”).

¹⁰⁹ Cary Sherman, General Counsel to the Recording Industry Association of America, once offered this explanation when I asked him why the content industry was so intent on getting control over all temporary as well as permanent copies of digital content.

Amendment.¹¹⁰ They have been quite deferential to Congressional judgments, using rational basis analysis rather than intermediate scrutiny.¹¹¹ They act as though the limits in Article I, sec. 8, cl. 8, both express and applied, lack meaningful substance.¹¹² The progress of science and the useful arts depends on information being in the public domain and available for reuses as much as on the grant of intellectual property rights. Third, the public may not be willing to accept laws that impede socially desirable uses. If people just say no to licensing and to technically protected content, the content industry, the courts and the legislature will have to adjust to this.

Participants in this conference have a role to play in preserving and nurturing the public domain. We can pay attention to legal and policy initiatives affecting this domain, analyze their implications, assess their constitutionality, and write and speak to various audiences to raise consciousness about the negative impacts that particular initiatives may have. Some of us will undertake litigation to preserve the public domain and contiguous territories.¹¹³ Others will draft testimony about pending or proposed legislation or offer alternative proposals. Aware that the rhetoric of scholarly discourse lacks the crispness of the vernacular, we will need to search for new vocabularies and metaphors to convey our messages of concern. Our efforts to affect policymaking will sometimes bear fruit (e.g., CIIA has not been enacted, and UCITA has encountered more difficulties than its drafters expected), but sometimes not (e.g., DMCA and CTEA). To achieve our objectives, we need not only to keep doing what we do well but also to reach beyond the communities we already inhabit to find friends and allies among those likely to be affected by initiatives that concern us. And we need to be cheerful about it too.

It is possible to build a new politics of intellectual property that has regard for the public domain and fair uses, although this will not be easy, and we certainly can't do it

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., *Eldred*, 239 F.3d at 375 (citing caselaw holding that copyrights are categorically immune from challenges under the first amendment). But see Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, *Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases*, 48 Duke L.J. 147 (1999)(criticizing the too frequent use of injunctions in intellectual property cases when First Amendment principles should make courts more wary of injunctive relief).

¹¹¹ See *Eldred*, 239 F.3d at 378.

¹¹² The D.C. Circuit, for example, recently interpreted the preamble to Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8 ("to promote the progress of science and useful arts") as not constituting a substantive limitation on Congress. *Id.* at 376-77.

¹¹³ Paul Heald has offered insights into legal claims that might be useful to challenge spurious claims of copyright in public domain material. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, *Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights*, 1 J. Intell. Prop. L. 259 (1994).

alone.¹¹⁴ To be successful, a new public-regarding politics of intellectual property must have a positive agenda of its own. It cannot just oppose whatever legislative initiatives the major content industry organizations support (although it almost certainly will need to do this as well). It should be grounded on the realization that information is not just or mainly a commodity; it is also a critically important resource and input to learning, to culture, to competition and innovation, and to democratic discourse. Intellectual property must find a home in a broader-based information policy, and be a servant, not a master, of the information society.

¹¹⁴ James Boyle was the first to call for a new politics of intellectual property. See, e.g., James Boyle, *The Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?*, 47 *Duke L.J.* 87 (1997). For my endorsement of this concept, see Pamela Samuelson, *Toward a New Politics of Intellectual Property*, 44 *Comm. ACM* 98 (March 2001).