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The prospect of private technology companies running government websites might worry Americans already concerned over the power Big Tech wields in everyday life. But Duke Law's Shitong Qiao finds that such collaborations in China have benefited citizens in some surprising ways — and may offer lessons for the U.S. in reshaping governance to increase efficiencies and improve systems of justice.

Qiao’s new research tracks the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party’s relationship with its tech behemoths, calling its example “governance with platforms.”

“Any person who is interested in governance in a contemporary world, including in China, cannot avoid the topic of these huge companies,” Qiao said. “They are not just wielding huge market power, but also huge influence on the political and legal systems.” 

In a forthcoming paper titled Governing with Digital Platforms: A Chinese Lesson for the U.S.?, Qiao, the Ken Young-Gak Yun and Jinah Park Yun Distinguished Professor at Duke Law School, describes how China’s government partnered with large technology companies to create digital platforms that have effectively transformed judicial case management, copyright protection, and online speech regulation in the country.

If such success can be achieved in an authoritarian state, he writes, integrating digital platforms into governance, with proper transparency and accountability mechanisms, could offer even greater benefits in a democracy like the U.S.

“Recognizing the state-platform alliance, particularly how digital platforms have actively shaped legal institutions, offers a fresh perspective on legal and institutional reform in the era of digital platforms,” he says. 

Utilizing tech platforms for “co-governance”

As online access spread in the late 1990s, China’s government initially sought to govern the internet directly, constructing a “Great Firewall” to limit information flow to its citizens. It later shifted to governing through platforms via its powerful state regulatory body, the Cyberspace Administration of China, which oversees the country’s huge technology companies such as Tencent, Alibaba, and Baidu. But as Qiao shows through three case studies, tech platforms had agendas that often aligned with those of the government. By leveraging their capabilities, Qiao says, the CCP has made these platforms “co-governors.” The partnerships have created efficiencies for institutions and positive spillover effects for citizens that Qiao says hold lessons for the U.S.

• Smart courts: Chinese judges face a backlog of cases and the CCP was keen to improve access to justice. Partnering with Tencent, which owns the messaging and payments app WeChat, in 2015 China’s highest court began implementing “smart courts” that use Tencent technology to automate routine processes and streamline the litigation process. Chinese citizens can file cases and attend trials online while judges can verify evidence and communicate quickly with parties. Every step is traceable, reducing courts’ administrative workload. Tencent charged the government minimal fees to develop the infrastructure for smart courts branded WeCourts. Qiao says benefits to the company include consolidated market power and enhanced positive brand visibility among the public.  
• Copyright: The Chinese government also worked with Tencent to combat online piracy of intellectual property. Tencent invested billions of dollars in exclusive license deals with major content providers such as Sony, Warner Music Group, and Universal Music, which motivated them to protect their IP. Tencent then transformed China’s business model of online music content, developing a 24/7 monitoring system that automatically issues takedown notices to websites where pirated content has been found and filing more than 13,000 lawsuits against violators between 2014 and 2018, creating a more consistent and reliable system of copyright enforcement.
• Online speech: Digital platforms weakened the CCP’s monopoly on traditional media by creating a public sphere in which citizens can voice their discontent, which Qiao argues has made the government more responsive to their needs. President Xi Jinping has made interacting with the public on digital platforms part of the national governing strategy, and party and state organizations’ social media accounts are used to monitor and influence public opinion. Qiao notes that, as in the U.S., platforms are incentivized to keep users engaged and active, which means letting them speak relatively freely. However, their success ultimately depends on their relationship with the CCP, which can exert regulatory power to demand that platforms address content it deems problematic. A dynamic of mutual compromise allows both tech leaders and the CCP to achieve their goals.

Accountability and transparency mechanisms needed 

Qiao acknowledges that China and the U.S. have very different political and cultural environments. The U.S. is a liberal democracy where there has long been a reasonably clear dividing line between public institutions and private markets, whereas in an authoritarian state like China, the boundary between government and the private sector is less clear. 

But Qiao argues that some U.S. tech companies such as Facebook already have such massive reach and influence among the American public that they effectively operate not as private entities but utilities that should be subject to some regulation. In other words, there are parallels to China’s digital platforms. 

“These are private platforms, but what they do is public; they have a huge impact on hundreds of millions of users,” he explained. “Sometimes the law should intervene and say, ‘You cannot do this.’ It’s not just a private decision.” 

Qiao cautions that if the U.S. government were to allow private tech companies to “co-govern” by developing and administering digital platforms, to preserve democratic principles it would need to require the same transparency and accountability mechanisms demanded of federal agencies. For example, if a tech company were to operate a system that provides access to courts or the Department of Motor Vehicles, it should give accountholders due process before closing accounts.

He notes that many U.S. regulations are more developed than in China. But, Qiao writes, “Even U.S. institutions have significant room for improvement, and digital platforms, with their control over digital infrastructure and technology, can contribute meaningfully to reform.” 

“The Chinese case does not offer a direct model for reform, but it does provide a promising cue for further exploration.”